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Japan's Keiretsu and Korea's Chaebol
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the
japanese economy is the prominence of keiretsu,
large corporate groups each centered around a
major commercial bank. Many of japan's blue-
chip companies, such as Nissan Motor, Mitsu-
bishi Electric, and NEC, belong to one of these
groups. Such corporate groupings are not an in-
dustrial structure unique to japan, however. For
example, many leading companies in Korea,
such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo, also
belong to large and diversified groups known as
chaebol.
This Weekly compares the key institutional
features of keiretsu and chaebol and finds that
despite some similarities there are critical dif-
ferences between the two types of groupings.
japan's keiretsu appear to be primarily market-
driven organizations that achieve at least two ob-
jectives. First, they reduce the information gap
between borrowers and lenders-a problem
that is likely to be more severe during periods
of rapid growth-and thereby facilitate the flow
of funds to the corporate sector. Second, keiretsu
serve as a mutual insurance scheme that helps
stabilize the operating performance of member
firms. Korea's chaebol, in contrast, appear to be
more creatures of government. In particular, the
Korean government's export promotion and in-
dustrial policies favored diversification of existing
firms into targeted industries.
Japan's keiretsu
Major keiretsu groups typically consist of firms
in diverse industries centered around a so-called
main bank; hence, they are sometimes called
"financial keiretsu." The precursors oftoday's
keiretsu were called "zaibatsu:' and they
wielded significant influence in the japanese
economy, especially toward the end of World
War II. The four large zaibatsu groups (Mitsu-
bishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) controlled
about one-fourth of the total paid-in corporate
capital at the end ofthe war; in finance, their
combined share was as high as 50 percent. To
reduce the concentration of economic power in
japan, the Allied Forces dissolved the zaibatsu
groups after World War II.
There are currently six large financial keiretsu in
japan (the "Big Six"): Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumi-
tomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo. The first
three originated from zaibatsu; the latter three
were formed after the war, each around a main
bank respectively ofthe same name. The postwar
ex-zaibatsu groups thus differ from their prewar
counterparts in one crucial respect: The pre-
war zaibatsu were controlled by holding com-
panies closely held by founder family members,
butthe postwar keiretsu are more diffusely owned
and loosely structured around acommercial bank.
Although no single clear-cut criterion defines a
given firm's membershipto anyone particular
keiretsu, group-affiliated firms generally share
three characteristics. First, firms within a given
keiretsu tend to hold interlocking shares. Second,
close consultation is maintained by keiretsu firms
on various business concerns and policies of mu-
tual interest. Third, and most importantly, firms in
financial keiretsu tend to rely heavily for financ-
ing on the main commercial bank and other core
financial institutions, such as insurance compa-
nies and trust banks. These financial institutions
generally hold equity in the firms to which they
lend (subject to a legal maximum).
While keiretsu are less dominant in the japanese
economy today than the zaibatsu were, their pres-
ence is still substantial. Almost half ofthe 200
largest firms in japan are members of one of the
major keiretsu. Collectively, firms belonging to
the Big Six account for roughly 40 to 55 percent
of sales in the natural resources, primary metal,
industrial machinery, chemical and cement in-
dustries, and for about 4 percent of the labor
force, 15 percent of capital, and 15 percent of
sales in the economy as of the late 1980s.
Economic rationale of keiretsu
Economists have offered a number of expla-
nations for the raison d'etre of keiretsu. One
hypothesis is that keiretsu firms jointly maxi"
mize profit by sharing information, reducing
transactions costs, and capturing economies of
scope through coordination of investment and
production decisions. If these considerations areFABSF
important, keiretsu firms should be more prof-
itable than non-affiliated firms. The evidence
suggests the very opposite, however: Keiretsu
firms tend to have lower rates of profit (see, for
example, Nakatani, 1984). The relatively lower
profits may be due in part to the fact that group
firms tend to make significantly higher interest
payments than independent firms with similar
financial structures and risks.
According to an alternative hypothesis, keiretsu
represent a system of mutual insurance where
group firms assist one another in times ofbusiness
hardship. Such assistance is usually provided by
the group's main bank. The higher lending rate
charged by the group's main bank can then be
thought of as an insurance premium. The evi-
dence seems consistent with this hypothesis:
Although group firms earn lower profits than in-
dependent firms, they tend to exhibit less vari-
ability in operating performance.
An additional benefit of maintaining long-term
relationships with a main bank within a keiretsu is
that it reduces the degree of information asymme-
try between the lender and corporate borrower
relating to, for example, the expected profitability
ofan investment or its riskiness. Such information
asymmetry gives rise to moral hazard problems
that constrain firms' ability to tap external financ-
ing and thus leads to underinvestment. Moreover,
the degree of moral hazard is likely to be more
severe during periods of rapid growth when firms
are .relatively more dependent on external financ-
ing to undertake profitable investment. Keiretsu
can thus be understood as an organizational re-
sponse to mitigate moral hazard problems which
may constrain firms' access to outside financing.
Indeed, available evidence suggests keiretsu
firms do not tend to cut back on investment as
sharply in response to a cash shortfall as do firms
without close bank ties. This is consistent with
the view that monitoring by the main bank helps
avoid information problems leading to under-
investment. There is also evidence that the close
bank-industry tie within keiretsu confers greater
flexibility in financing: Groupfirms are less prone
to curtail investment during bouts of financial
distress, s,uggesting that by virtue of possessing
inside information on member firms, the main
bank can provide timely help when they are suf-
fering a temporary setback (see Weekly Letter,
March 29, 1991l.
Korea's chaebol
The chaebol groups in Korea consist of diversi-
fied business firms with a concentrated owner-
ship structure. As with japan's financial keiretsu,
Korea's chaebol contain many firms that are hori-
zontally rather than vertically diversified. In most
cases, immediate family members ofthe entre-
preneur who started the group hold controlling
interest in most of the group companies. The
ownership and control structure of chaebol thus
resembles the zaibatsu of the pre-war period in
japan more than the post-war keiretsu. (In fact,
"chaebol" and "zaibatsu" are, respectively,
Korean and japanese readings of the very same
Chinese ideograms for "financial combine" or
"clique.")
While keiretsu have declined in importance over
time in the japanese economy, Korea's chaebol
have increased. The ratio ofthe combined sales
of the top 10 chaebol, consisting of about 150
companies, to Korean GNP rose from less than
15 percent in the early 1970s to slightly over
40 percent in the mid-1980s. The total sales to
GNP ratio of Samsung, on of the three largest
chaebol, rose from less than 1 percent in 1965
to over 14 percent in 1984.
Role of the government
The emergence and growth of chaebol is closely
linked to heavy government intervention in Korea's
economic development. In its bid to accelerate
Korea's transition from an agrarian to an indus-
trialized economy, the government adopted a
strategy of supporting the growth of existing
firms, rather than encouraging the formation of
new firms. Government policy therefore created
a bias toward a horizontally integrated group
structure. The rationale behind this policy was
that growth through diversification of existing
firms would economize on scarce entrepreneu-
rial talent and technical knowledge.
In the early 1960s the government also initiated a
series of development plans fostering key sectors
by granting them preferential access to credit at
below-market interest rates. In the initial phase,
the government targeted the growth of the export
sector, particularly in light manufacturing, by
directly linking the provision of subsidized credit
and export volume. This policy created an in-
centive for existing firms to branch into various
export-producing manufactures and other export-
related businesses, and to establish a generalSong, Byung-Nak. 1990. The Rise ofthe Korean Econ-
omy. Hong Kong: Oxford.
Nakatani, Iwao. 1984. liThe Economic Role of Finan-
cial Corporate Grouping:' In The Economic
Analysis ofjapanese Firms, ed. M. Aoki. New
York: North-Holland.
Hong, Wontack, and Park Yung Chul. 1984. liThe Fi-
nancing of Export-Oriented Growth in Korea." In
Pacific Growth and Financial Interdependence,
ed. A.H.H. Tan and B. Kapur. Sydney: Allen and
Unwin.
difference has important consequences for risk-
sharing in the credit market. In japan, it is the
main bank that monitors borrowers as a quasi-
insider to keiretsu member firms. In Korea it is
the government that controls the flow of credit
and consequently functions as the de facto mon-




There are signs of loosening ties among keiretsu
firms in japan, as the deepening and internation-
alization of financial markets have eroded the
role of main banks. The prospect for a loosening
of chaebol ties and weakening ortheir role in
Korea seems more mixed. The Korean govern-
ment, through regulatory measures, has sought
to diffuse the concentration of ownership within
chaebol by pushing for greater sales of equity
shares in public securities markets. However,
Korea is likely to maintain its development strat-
egy of promoting targeted industries and relying
on preferential financing in the near future.
Given their past role as the conduits of this pol-
icy, chaebol groups will likely loom large in




trading company specializing in the marketing of
exports and imports. This process of diversifica-
tion led to the initial rise of most chaebol groups
in Korea.
The focus of Korea's industrial policy shifted to
heavy and chemical industries in the early 1970s.
Again, the combination of policies favoring di-
versification of existing companies into new tar-
geted industries and preferential access to cheap
credit favored the further growth of chaebol
groups. The average number of firms in each
chaebol approximately doubled between the
early to late 1970s, as the groups expanded into
more capital-intensive activities. Taking advan-
tage of cheap credit in the 1980s, the chaebol
began diversifying into businesses not explicitly
targeted by government policy, such as con-
sumption goods production and real estate
investment.
The relatively greater role of government policy
in the formation and growth of chaebol is ob-
vious in a key organizational difference from
japan's financial keiretsu: Commercial banks
in Korea by law are not allowed to be a part of
chaebol groups. To a large extent, therefore, the
government has been the main conduit of fi-
nance to chaebol firms. For example, until the
early 1980s, the government was the majority
share holder (25 to 35 percent) of all major com-
mercial banks in Korea and effectively controlled
all significant lending decisions. Due to the dom-
inant role of the Korean government in the allo-
cation of credit, banks have had less discretion
and relatively little incentive to monitor lending
compared to main banks in japan's financial
keiretsu.
Conclusion
Compared to japan's keiretsu, direct government
policy appears to have played a much more im-
portant role in the rise of Korea's chaebol. This
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